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The objective of this Article is to integrate legal and social conceptions
of citizenship as they materialize at the geographic, political, and
social border crossings that accompany transnational mobility. Rather
than pose the question "who is the citizen?," I ask "who is the citizen’s
Other?," partly as a means of surfacing what we mean by citizenship by
thinking about who we designate as its alterity. Against the current of
most contemporary scholarship, I commend resurrecting the concept
of statelessness as an antipodal reference point for citizenship. My
intuition is that a version of statelessness still dwells in the substratum
of much citizenship discourse, and that rendering a plausible account
of it under contemporary conditions may prove helpful in linking
conversations about legal and social citizenship. I supplement the
conventional understanding of the stateless person (apatride) as one
who lacks any citizenship in a state by also designating as stateless
one who possesses citizenship but lacks a state.
My analysis draws on Hannah Arendt’s famous exegesis on the
relationship between the apatride, the refugee, and the condition
of rightlessness, as well as contemporary refugee jurisprudence. I
demonstrate how subject positions commonly identified as the citizen’s
Other, including the refugee, the alien and the second-class citizen, are
better understood as nested within a larger matrix where the apatride
represents the ultimate negation of citizenship. I then introduce the
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notion of the "heft" of citizenship as a method of assessing how legal
citizenship and social citizenship interact to position an array of
subjects between these stylized poles of citizenship and statelessness.
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship as an analytic category is remarkably capacious, as if self-
consciously resisting the exclusionary impulses that historical practices of
citizenship cannot. Scholarship in this field is hospitable to an array of
descriptive, critical and normative projects across a range of academic
disciplines. Citizenship describes status, rights, practices and performances.
It applies at the level of the state (national citizenship), below the
state (urban citizenship), across states (supranational citizenship), between
states (transnational citizenship), beyond states (cosmopolitan and global
citizenship), and in deterritorialized socio-political spaces (the market,
terrorist networks, the internet). It specifies relationships between the
state and individual or group identities (multicultural citizen, queer citizen,
gendered citizen), denotes various degrees of membership (virtual citizen,
full citizen, partial citizen, flexible citizen) and describes idealized subjects
of governance (market citizen, neo-liberal citizen), and that is only a partial
list. If citizenship were a home appliance, it would be the only one you
would ever need.
Linda Bosniak recently appealed to scholars to "deepen the conversation
between inward-looking and boundary conscious approaches to citizenship,"
and this Article takes up the invitation by promoting a bridging of social
and legal conceptions of citizenship.1 By legal citizenship, I refer to the
formal status of membership in a state, or nationality as it is understood
in international law. The rights common to legal citizenship in virtually
all countries include the unconditional right to enter and remain in the
territory, access to consular assistance and diplomatic protection, and the
franchise. For present purposes, social citizenship encompasses the more
voluminous package of rights, responsibilities, entitlements, duties, practices
and attachments that define membership in a polity, and situate individuals
within that community.Although it is conventional todismiss legal citizenship
as (merely) formal, in contrast to the more substantive character of social
citizenship, these designations are potentially misleading. The rights usually
1 LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 2 (2006).
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reserved to legal citizens, especially the unconditional right of entry and
residence, remain crucial in an era where lawful access to the territory of a
state (rather than citizenship per se) is the pre-requisite to the exercise and
enjoyment of most rights, entitlements and opportunities available inside the
state.2
Indeed, I contend that citizenship scholarship would benefit from a turn
toward a functional and interactive understanding of citizenship, rather than a
focus on categorizing or labeling the type of citizenship under consideration.
In this preliminary contribution, I am interested in uniting legal and social
conceptions of citizenship as they materialize in the context of migration,
and at the geographic, political, and social border crossings that accompany
transnational mobility.
My argument approaches citizenship obliquely. Rather than pose the
question "who is the citizen?," I begin by asking, "who is the citizen’s
Other?," partly as a means of surfacing what we mean by citizenship
through thinking about who we designate as its alterity. Against the current
of most contemporary scholarship, I commend resurrecting the concept of
statelessness as an antipodal reference point for citizenship.3 In so doing, I
supplement the conventional understanding of the stateless person as onewho
lacks citizenship in any state with the emergent figure of one who possesses
citizenship but lacks a state.
This revival of statelessness may seem formalistic and downright
anachronistic, for as Aihwa Ong asserts:
We have traveled far from the idea of citizenship as a legal
status in a nation-state, and as a condition opposed to the
condition of statelessness. Binary oppositions between citizenship
and statelessness, between national territoriality and its absence,
are not useful for thinking about the new configurations of spaces
and new combination of factors that affect political mobilizations
and claims. Rights and entitlements once associated with citizens
are becoming dispersed among populations who can include non-
citizens. Furthermore, the difference between having and not having
2 For further discussion of territoriality, see Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical
Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389
(2007).
3 Linda Kerber also contends that "the ultimate ‘other’ to citizenship lies in its absence,
in lack, in statelessness," although she arrives at this position via a different route
and attributes to statelessness a somewhat different meaning. See Linda Kerber,
Toward a History of Statelessness in America, 57 AM. Q. 727, 731 (2005).
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citizenship is becoming blurred as the territorialization of entitlements
is increasingly made in spaces beyond the state.4
Yet, even as one concedes the detachment of most rights from citizenship
status, disavows the state’s monopoly over citizenship, and deploys
citizenship in ways that transcend the bounds of territoriality, I contend
that one ought not to equate the declining importance of citizenship in a
particular state with a diminution in the value of membership in a state.
Indeed, even proponents of cosmopolitan citizenship retain a place for
state-based membership. My intuition is that a version of statelessness (not
captured by the figure of the refugee in law) still dwells in the substratum of
much citizenship discourse, and that rendering a plausible account of it in
under contemporary conditions may prove helpful in linking conversations
about legal and social citizenship.
My method involves retrieving statelessness from its tangled relationship
with refugeehood. I begin with Hannah Arendt’s conflation of the
stateless person (apatride) into the refugee, whom she depicts as the
contemporary embodiment of rightlessness. I describe how, at the very
moment Arendt was publishing The Origins of Totalitarianism,5 international
law was assiduously segregating statelessness from refugeehood, retaining
only a small convergent zone between them. I next examine how refugee
jurisprudence has negotiated this juridical overlap between statelessness and
refugee status, with predictably problematic results.
I retain the focus on refugee law for purposes of developing a more
expansive conception of statelessness which, while not labeled as such, is
accommodated to a certain extent within refugee law as a condition worthy
of protection. I refer here to the possession of citizenship in a polity that
is effectively non-functional — a failed state. My reanimated version of
statelessness thus includes the person without citizenship and the citizen
without a state. Articulated in this way, I posit statelessness as the limit
concept against which citizenship defines itself.
The second part of the Article demonstrates the analytical utility of
statelessness as the citizen’s Other. Rather than deploy a stark and totalizing
binary of stateless/citizen, I suggest a heuristic derived from my analysis
that would posit statelessness as the ultimate negation of citizenship.
Statelessness is thus conceived as the void that citizenship fills to a greater
or lesser degree, depending on an array of factors discussed in the latter part
4 Aihwa Ong, (Re)articulations of Citizenship, 38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 697 (2005).
5 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1978)
(1951).
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of this Article. In this sense, citizenship might be thought of in terms of
a container that is seldom completely empty (statelessness) or completely
full.
At this stage, my focus shifts from statelessness as a legal or empirical
reality to consider how statelessness as a limit concept can clarify the array
of more common and familiar subject positions that travel under the rubric
of citizen. I introduce the notion of the "heft of citizenship" to describe the
variability in the cumulative content of citizenship experienced by those
whose citizenship container is somewhere between empty and full.
My inquiry is primarily sociological rather than normative. However, as
others have noted, citizenship retains an intrinsically normative rhetorical
component. I also concede that in framing citizenship by reference to the
state, I appear to normatively privilege the state as the locus of citizenship.
My response is that I regard the state at present as an inescapable repository
of citizenship, but not the exclusive one.
I. WHO IS THE CITIZEN’S OTHER?
As Engin Isin observes, the discursive construction of citizen and Other
emerges from a mutually constitutive dialogic process.6 Some of the more
popular Others include the foreigner, the alien, the second-class citizen, the
refugee, the stranger and the versatile yet anodyne "non-citizen." Each of
these designations reflects certain presuppositions. For instance, the category
of "second-class citizen" typically describes some form of inequality between
those who are always already formal members of a bounded community
(usually a state). Invocations of non-citizenship in this context usually signify
a failure to vindicate, fulfill or respect the substantive entitlements of extant
citizenship. This framework makes intelligible T.H. Marshall’s account of
citizenship as the product of rights acquisition. In contrast, Hannah Arendt
regards citizenship as the pre-requisite to acquiring rights, as captured in her
famous characterization of citizenship as "the right to have rights."7 As Linda
6 ENGIN F. ISIN, BEING POLITICAL: GENEALOGIES OF CITIZENSHIP 4 (2002).
7 ARENDT, supra note 5, at 296. Margaret Somers reconciles this apparent divergence
between Marshall’s and Arendt’s accounts by developing the claim that "Marshall’s
priority of partaking in the social heritage and Arendt’s ontological postulate of
political belonging both make membership as citizens the foundational necessity,
and right, of human personhood and identity." Margaret Somers, Citizenship,
Statelessness and Market Fundamentalism, in MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, ETHNOS
35, 55 (Y. Michal Bodemann & Go¨c¸kce Yurdakul eds., 2006).
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Bosniak also remarks, relying on the rhetorical force of citizenship to advance
the interests of non-citizens within a polity is a problematic strategy.8 Indeed,
advocating on behalf of non-citizens by framing their claims as access to
(social) citizenship, or complaining that non-citizens are unjustly treated like
second-class citizens, seems to invite the retort that they are, after all, not
citizens.9
The designations "alien," "foreigner" or stranger draw the lens back from
the interior of the community to the limning function of citizenship. As
such, these categories avoid the erasure implied in the foregoing assumption
of universal legal citizenship. They direct attention to exclusionary practices
that persist in the face of the extension of rights to a subset of legal non-
citizens. The vast literature on transnationalism demonstrates the multiple
linkages across an array of dimensions (legal, social, kinship, economic,
political) that create transnational social spaces within which individual
migrants and diasporic groups constitute and perform their identity as
members of communities that transcend state borders. Participation in these
networks in turn becomes labeled as a form of citizenship unto itself.10
Attention to the specific potency of state citizenship has waned as
the emanation of rights from supranational institutions alerts us to other
sources of rights; the simultaneity of belonging along various non-legal
dimensions also draws attention to other loci of membership. Nevertheless,
an unarticulated (though empirically reasonable) assumption is that migrants
8 Linda Bosniak coins the oxymoronic term "the citizenship of aliens" to express
the paradox, whereby aliens in fact do successfully claim rights associated with
citizenship in its non-legal sense. BOSNIAK, supra note 1, at 2 passim. She also
remarks that
the focus on the denial of rights to status citizens often renders the critique
insensitive to the history of systematic denial of citizenship status itself to
members of subordinated groups in this country . . . . This account, furthermore,
obscures the ways in which a lack of the status of citizenship itself, in the form of
alienage, sometimes serves as a basis for caste-like treatment and discrimination.
Id. at 88.
9 In response to this objection, Bosniak replies that in practice, "many of citizenship’s
core attributes do not depend on formal citizenship status at all but are extended to
individuals based on the facts of their personhood and national territorial presence."
Id. at 3.
10 See generally RAINER BAUBO¨CK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1994); THOMAS FAIST, THE VOLUME AND
DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL SPACES
(2000). For a critical survey of the various meanings ascribed to transnational
citizenship, see Jonathan Fox, Unpacking "Transnational Citizenship," 8 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 171 (2005).
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residing in one state will possess legal citizenship somewhere else. One may
be an alien, a stranger, a denizen or a foreigner in many places, but one is
presumptively a citizen somewhere.
The foregoing leads me to suggest that the various terms used to describe
the citizen’s Other are nested within a larger opposition between the one who
is notmerely an alien in relation to a particular state, but who is alienated from
the global regime of territorially sovereign states as such. Here, of course, one
hearkens back to Hannah Arendt’s classic exegesis, in which she identifies
stateless people (apatrides) as "the most symptomatic group in contemporary
politics."11 The statelessness she describes arose through deliberate acts of
mass denationalization and expulsion by totalitarian (or proto-totalitarian)
regimes in theEuropean inter-war andNazi era. This temporal and geographic
focus enabled Arendt to plausibly remark that "the core of statelessness . . .
is identical with the refugee question."12 Once stripped of her citizenship and
territorially displaced, the apatride/refugee was exposed as merely human,
and effectively rightless:
The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of
a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those
who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with
people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships
— except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred
in the abstract nakedness of being human.13
It bears observing that more than half a century after she delivered her
indictment of the vacuity of universal human rights, and well into the
evolution of the international human rights regime, Giorgio Agamben’s
figure of the refugee as "the limit concept that radically calls into question
the fundamental categories of the nation state, from the birth-nation to the
man-citizen link"14 owes an explicit debt to Arendt.15
11 ARENDT, supra note 5, at 277.
12 Id. at 279.
13 Id. at 299.
14 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 134 (1998).
15 Although it is tempting to evoke Agamben’s bio-political "bare life" or homo sacer
as the citizen’s Other, doing so would distort Agamben’s project in the service
of what is (admittedly) a more conventional undertaking. Agamben’s inquiry is
directed at exposing how sovereignty, properly understood, inscribes "bare life" into
political existence, and renders incoherent the very exercise of contrasting citizen
and Other:
It is even possible that this limit [expressed in the figure of homo sacer], on
which the politicization and the exception of natural life in the juridical order of
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Arendt’s conflation of statelessness into refugeehood had some basis in the
desultory legal interventions of the inter-war years. However, the post-WWII
international legal framework regarded statelessness and refugeehood as
distinct categories for normative and institutional purposes. Not only is the
apatride not the epitome of the refugee in law, statelessness is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for refugee status. The international legal
order views statelessness primarily as an administrative anomaly in the global
filing system that assigns every human being to at least one state. While
the apatride’s "condition of infinite danger"16 is generally acknowledged as
a sociological, political and humanitarian reality by international institutions,
the existential rightlessness of the apatride remains an awkward concession
for the international human rights regime to recognize in law. After all,
the ideal of universal human rights predicated on personhood rather than
citizenship remains an article of faith, even if no institution outside the state
is actually able or willing to vindicate or enforce these rights.17 States may
undertake obligations to reduce statelessness18 and to not create it,19 but the
apatride in law — unlike the refugee — is not regarded as intrinsically
abject.
A. Stateless Refugees and the Land of No Return
Historical and institutional contingencies resulted in the conceptual
and institutional divergence between stateless persons and refugees in
international law.20 International law defines a stateless person as one "who
the state depends . . . has now — in the new biopolitical horizon of states with
national sovereignty, moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life
is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category.
Id. at 140. Put in other terms, the other of Agamben’s homo sacer is perhaps not the
citizen, but the sovereign. Id. at 111.
16 MICHAELWALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 32-63 (1983).
17 The main exception is the European Court of Human Rights, a supranational tribunal
that actually renders enforceable decisions.
18 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, June 6, 1960, 360 U.N.T.S.
117.
19 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, art. 1, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S.
175; European Convention on Nationality, art. 6, Nov. 6, 1997, Europ. T.S. No.
166; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 20, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123; Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
53. Notably, the treaties dealing explicitly with nationality and statelessness have
attracted few signatories.
20 See Carol Batchelor, Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection, 7
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 232 (1995).
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is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law."21
It takes no account of how the condition was produced, nor does it attend
to the quality of citizenship entailed. In this sense, statelessness expresses
a purely formal lack of status. The main concession to the relation between
the absence of formal status of citizenship and the functional attributes of
citizenship is the recognition of de facto statelessness in addition to de jure
statelessness, which covers situations where a state refuses to acknowledge
the citizenship of a national abroad for purposes of diplomatic protection,
consular assistance or repatriation.22 Notably, de facto statelessness speaks
only to an external dimension of nationality, where the relationship between
the state and its citizen implicate a third state.
In contrast, the refugee regime confers protection where states of
nationality have failed to fulfill certain functional aspects of the citizenship
relationship within the state. Central to the legitimacy of this evaluative
exercise is the principle that the state owes a duty of protection to its
nationals.23 This duty extends far beyond the external provision of diplomatic
or consular protection against third states. It addresses the nature of the
relationship between state and citizen. Debates about the content of the duty
owed by states to citizens are rehearsed in refugee jurisprudence through
the interpretation of persecution and the criteria for state protection, but few
dispute that persecution includes serious violations of fundamental civil and
political rights.
Breach of this duty of protection entitles the national to seek refuge
elsewhere, while the right against forcible return (non-refoulement)
guaranteed by the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees24
supplies the "surrogate protection" replacing the genuine protection that only
the state of citizenship owes. As the Supreme Court of Canada states in the
Ward case,
International refugee law was formulated to serve as a back-up to
the protection one expects from the state of which an individual is a
21 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 17, art. 1.
22 See Niraj Nathwani, The Purpose of Asylum, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 354, 357-64
(2000); Carol Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality
Status, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 156, 171-74 (1998).
23 This exchange of protection for a monopoly on force is a classic rationale for entry
into the social contract and the legitimacy of sovereign rule.
24 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 2545; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
342 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 8:333
national. It was meant to come into play only in situations when that
protection is unavailable, and then only in certain situations.25
The juridical incongruity between refugee status and statelessness becomes
apparent within this legal framework, insofar as states owe no duty
of protection to a non-national, and stateless people are non-nationals
everywhere. In order to avoid the absurdity that would render stateless
people ineligible for refugee status, the drafters of the Refugee Convention
interpolated stateless persons into the refugee definition (article 1) through
a modified test:
"convention refugee" means any person who
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group
or political opinion,
(i) is outside the country of the person’s nationality and is unable
or by reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail himself [sic] of
the protection of that country, or
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of
the person’s former habitual residence and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, is unwilling to return to that country . . . .
Since the stateless person has no country of nationality, the refugee definition
introduces "country of . . . former habitual residence" as a proxy.26 The
stateless asylum seeker cannot avail herself of the protection of her country
of former habitual residence because, as a non-citizen, she is not entitled to it
even in the default case where no other state owes her protection. Therefore,
she need only demonstrate her inability or unwillingness to return to the
country of former habitual residence.
The well-documented extension of many elements of social citizenship
to non-citizens legally residing within Western states might support a
hypothesis that many stateless persons enjoy a significant measure of
security in countries of habitual residence, even absent a formal legal
25 Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, para. 25. Recognition of refugee status neither
blames nor penalizes states of origin, though some states certainly take umbrage
when their nationals are recognized as refugees by other countries. After all, the
process of determining the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution implicitly
opens up to normative scrutiny the practices of other states.
26 To the extent that most stateless people identify themselves as possessing a national
identity in the non-legal sense, one might suggest that the stateless person is,
perpetually, outside the country of her nationality.
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duty of protection. This would buttress the rationale behind restricting
refugee protection to that subset of stateless persons who are genuinely
at risk of serious human rights violations. As it happens, however, the
progressive expansion of rights to non-citizens commonly associated with
the phenomenon of "post-national citizenship" has limited purchase in most
apatrides’ countries of habitual residence.
More important, however, is the refugee definition’s implication that
admission to a country is something other than an instantiation of that
country’s duty of protection. What happens if the state of former habitual
residence refuses to re-admit a stateless person? The answer to this question
exposes the incoherence produced by the suppression of statelessness as
abjection. Cases that raise this issue characteristically concern stateless
Palestinians claiming refugee status against an Arab state of theMiddle-East.
In the usual case, the young male Palestinian refugee claimant was either
born in the country of former habitual residence or moved there at a young
age. The claimant possessed some form of residency permit, which he
had either been unable to renew for reasons beyond his control, or which
he had allowed to expire. In either case, the claimant was not legally
entitled to re-enter and resume living in his country of former habitual
residence. Despite the inability to return, these refugee claims usually fail.
The following excerpt from the first level decision in Altawil conveys the
sincerity of the Immigration and Refugee Board’s commitment to the formal
cleavage separating stateless person from the refugee:
It is unfortunate that the claimant, a stateless Palestinian, has nowhere
to go and live a normal, productive life. He is in front of . . . the panel,
seeking protection as a Convention Refugee, but he does not need
protection. We have found that he does not have a well founded fear of
persecution. He needs a place to live. He has no place to go legally, not
even Qatar, his former country of former habitual residence. He is a
prime example of a decent, well educated, stateless person, deserving
of a country to live in, but this does not make him a Convention
refugee.27
The right to enter and remain is a virtual sine qua non of legal citizenship
and for that very reason, admitting that denial of the right constitutes
persecution would collapse statelessness into refugeehood. In Thabet, the
Immigration and Refugee Board concluded that the refusal by Kuwait to
readmit the claimant followed simply from his lack of a valid residency
27 Quoted in Altawil v. Canada, [1996] 114 F.T.R. 241, para. 6 (Fed. Ct.).
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permit and did not constitute an act of persecution against him as a
Palestinian, noting that "since the Liberation of Kuwait and the normalization
process, Palestinians . . . have received extensions of their residence permits
and are not being deported as they were at the conclusion of the [1991]
Gulf War."28 The irony, of course, is that the tribunal’s own findings evince
the terminal precariousness of a stateless personwithout security of residence:
His entitlement to enter and remain is a privilege and not a right, potentially
revocable without notice or justification.
Higher courts have upheld the finding that refusal by a country of
former habitual residence to permit the return of a stateless person simply
results from the general application of a general law restricting the entry
of non-citizens without valid residency permits, and so does not constitute
persecution. For example, the Federal Court of Canada confirmed that
although "a denial of a right to return [to a former habitual residence] may,
in itself, constitute an act of persecution by a state . . . there must be
something in the real circumstances which suggests persecutorial intent or
conduct."29
The end point of these jurisprudential maneuvers is that a stateless person
is not necessarily a refugee from a country of habitual residence that
refuses to re-admit her.30 In so finding, courts effectively assimilate stateless
persons into the category of alien vis-a`-vis the country of former habitual
residence. I mean by this that they efface the disproportionate impact of a
refusal to permit return to a stateless resident by neglecting the fact that an
alien, in principle, has somewhere else to go (the state of citizenship)while the
stateless person does not. Another way ofmaking the same point is to observe
that the refugee definition protects persons from persecution on grounds of
nationality; recognizing that a denial of re-entry to one devoid of nationality
is persecutory remains outside the logic of the definition, despite (or perhaps
because of) the fact that the refugee regime constitutes the lone international
derogation from the conventional equation of territorial sovereignty with
border control. The sovereign power of states to exclude non-citizens is thus
28 Thabet v. Canada, [1998] 160 D.L.R. 666, para. 32 (Fed. Ct. App.).
29 Altawil, [1996] 114 F.T.R. 241, para. 11. This reasoning was followed in Thabet.
30 As a practical matter, it may be impossible to deport the stateless person for the
very reason that no country will accept her; furthermore, States Party to the 1954
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 17, may provide
relief to a stateless person as well. My present point, however, is that these remedies
are discretionary and do not acknowledge the persecutory dimension of a refusal to
readmit a stateless person.
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depoliticized and reinscribed at the precise moment of international law’s
intervention.31
Where does this leave the stateless person who does not qualify as a
refugee? The question is both literal and figurative. In Australia, the answer
in law is indefinite detention. In Al-Kateb v. Godwin,32 a majority of the
HighCourt ofAustralia affirmedmandatory, indefinite detention of a stateless
Palestinian whose refugee claim was rejected and who was not returnable to
Gaza or to Kuwait (his place of birth and former country of habitual residence
respectively).33 The answer in other jurisdictions is more speculative, to the
extent that higher courts have only addressed the situation of a person who
possesses citizenship status but for other reasons cannot be returned to the
country of nationality. In Zadvydas v. Davis,34 the United States Supreme
Court came to the opposite conclusion from the High Court of Australia
regarding non-removable non-citizens. The U.S. Supreme Court read into
the relevant statute an implicit six-month limitation on detention pending
removal, observing that indefinite detentionwould raise serious constitutional
doubts. TheUKdecision inA v. Secretary of State for the Home Department35
also ruled against indefinite detention where deportation of persons deemed
threats to national security was impossible because of a substantial risk of
torture by the state of nationality.36 Although the litigants in the US and UK
cases were not de jure stateless, they shared with apatrides the fact that there
was no country that owed them a duty of protection and to which they could
return.
The foregoing analysis generates the preliminary conclusion that the
international legal regime, contra Arendt, remains averse to seeing
statelessness as an existential condition of rightlessness. The refugee,
31 It is the singular irony of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ solemn
avowal that "everyone has the right to a nationality" stipulates no addressee.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71,
U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
32 (2004) 208 A.L.R. 124 (Austl.).
33 A few months after the decision, Premier John Howard announced that non-
deportable aliens would be released from detention on "removal pending bridging
visas." Juliet Curtin, Never Say Never, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 355, 370 (2005).
34 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
35 [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.).
36 See also Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] S.C.C. 9, where the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the constitutionality of "extended periods of detention pending deportation,"
but acknowledged that particular detentions may, at a certain point, constitute
"cruel and unusual treatment" or be "inconsistent with the principles of fundamental
justice," thereby infringing the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Id. para 123.
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defined as the one outside her country because of a well-founded fear
of persecution, is the closest legal analog to the rightless person. In order
to sustain this bifurcation between refugee and apatride, entry onto the
territory of a country of former habitual residence cannot be characterized
as a fundamental human right, because the effect of doing so would be to
largely assimilate statelessness into refugeehood. The result is to consign
stateless migrants into a legal abyss which, I suggest, evinces the persistent
disruptiveness of statelessness today, even in an era when the discourse of
universal human rights exerts greater allure than ever before.
Having argued for the continuing conceptual salience of statelessness
(despite its juridical suppression in refugee law), I now turn to amending
the conventional understanding of statelessness with a contemporary
supplement, again drawing on refugee jurisprudence.
B. Citizen Without a State
For Arendt, the archetypal refugee-producing state is one which is capable
of marshalling, manifesting and executing the sovereign power required to
organize and execute mass denationalization. While acknowledging that the
eruption of statelessness in inter-war Europe followed temporally from civil
conflict, Arendt attributed mass denationalization to "a state structure which,
if it was not yet fully totalitarian, at least would not tolerate any opposition
and would rather lose its citizens than harbour people with different views."37
This model of the state as the exclusive and direct source of persecution, and
as a unitary formation capable of exercising total(itarian) control not only fit
NaziGermany, it proved serviceable for themain intended beneficiaries of the
Refugee Convention, namely dissidents from the Soviet bloc.
By the late twentieth century, this model of mass denationalization was
glaringly underinclusive of the major causes of statelessness or of refugee
flows.38 The vision of the totalitarian state that animated Arendt, possessing
both capacity and will to extend or deny citizenship and its attendant rights,
37 ARENDT, supra note 5, at 278.
38 The most recent production of statelessness that resembles Arendt’s model transpired
in Latvia and Estonia in the 1990s. The re-emergence of the Baltic states upon the
dissolution of the Soviet Union stranded hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians
who were survivors and descendents of Stalin’s massive population transfers in
the 1940s. The initial citizenship laws drafted by the successor/restored states
of Latvia and Estonia automatically extended citizenship to pre-1940 residents
and their descendents. This effectively excluded ethnic Russians from citizenship,
leaving them stateless. Russia offered to grant Russian citizenship to these ethnic
Russians, but this would not secure their continued presence in Latvia or Estonia.
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overdetermines the contemporary sources and operation of statelessness and
forced migration, at least when situated against more complex and dispersed
forms of power within and beyond territorial political units.
Today’s refugees are more likely to flee states of the South characterized
by chronic political, social and economic instability. These dysfunctions
in turn erupt or manifest in civil disorder, armed conflict, insurgency, and
high levels of violence emanating from the state or from non-state actors in
circumstances where the state is complicit, indifferent, or simply unable to
exercise effective control. The causes of these various crises are complex and
contested, and pose several challenges to the scope of the refugee definition.
These include the role of non-state actors as persecutors, the ability of the
state (as opposed to its willingness) to protect, and the availability of refugee
protection in civil war situations where an individual may be one of a very
sizable group who faces a risk of persecution for a Convention reason.39
These issues emerged most starkly in cases of asylum seekers fleeing so-
called "failed states." The term has been applied variously to Somalia, Sierra
Leone, Cambodia, Sudan, Liberia and Afghanistan, among others. A salient
common feature is the state’s "fundamental loss of institutional capability."40
The option of naturalization presented by Latvia and Estonia to these Russian
speakers has been continually criticized for imposing language requirements so
onerous that they are virtually unattainable for many ethnic Russians, given
that Russian was the public language in the Baltic states throughout the Soviet
era. Perhaps the most important difference between this phenomenon and that
described by Arendt concerns the role of supranational political and economic
institutions in leveraging human rights. Since the Baltic states aspire to membership
in the European Union (and the anticipated economic benefits accruing therefrom),
the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe (OSCE) were able to apply pressure to Latvia and Estonia to ease the
requirements for naturalization. Nevertheless, over a half-million ethnic Russians
in Latvia and Estonia remain stateless today. In May 2006, the Council of Europe
opened for the signature the Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in
Relation to State Succession, May 19, 2006, Council Europ. T.S. No. 200,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Word/200.doc. The treaty
supplements the European Convention on Nationality by imposing an obligation
on successor states to grant citizenship to habitual residents of the territory at the
time of succession if such persons would otherwise be rendered stateless. Id. art.
5. Palestinians, the largest stateless population in the world, never possessed a
Palestinian citizenship to lose.
39 The first two issues also emerged as particularly salient in extending refugee
protection to women fleeing gender-based persecution, which is often committed in
the private sphere by non-state actors.
40 WORLD BANK, 1997 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 158 (1997), quoted in Tara
Magner, Note, Does a Failed State Country of Origin Result in a Failure of
International Protection? A Review of Policies Toward Asylum-Seekers in Leading
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The central governmentmay have collapsed, ormay simply lack legitimacy in
the eyes ofmost of the populace.Whatever the causes of the fragmentation and
dissolution of institutions and practices of governance, there is effectively no
state capable of protecting citizens in themost fundamental sense of providing
security or basic services. The abuses of fundamental rights associated with
persecutionmayemanate fromprivate actors, from rebel or insurgencygroups
battling for control, fromactorswhoclaimbut are not recognized as exercising
governmental authority, or from actors connected to an invading or occupying
state. Citizenship truly is purely formal for nationals of these "failed states,"
for it delivers virtually none of the protection associated with membership in
a functioning polity.41
Up until recently, receiving states varied considerably in their willingness
to interpret the refugee definition in a manner that would encompass asylum
seekers fleeing the chaos, conflict and violence of failed states, especially
Afghanistan and Somalia. Several jurisprudential obstacles stood between
these forced migrants and refugee status. Bringing these forced migrants
under the aegis of refugee protection required receiving states to recognize
non-state actors as agents of persecution; to accept that the absence of a
state capable of providing protection denotes a failure of protection; and to
not disqualify victims of civil war on the basis that their fear of persecution
was indistinguishable from that of other civilians. Liberal interpretations
adopted these three propositions.42 Restrictive approaches rejected at least
one.43 The recent European Council Directive on Minimum Standards for
the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons
Asylum Nations, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 703 (2001). The Failed State Index, produced
annually by Carnegie Endowment for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine, defines
a failing state as "one in which the government does not have effective control of
its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population,
does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks
a monopoly on the use of force." Foreign Policy, The Failed States Index (May-June
2006), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3420.
41 In 1998, outgoing Colombian President Ernesto Samper made a startling admission
of state failure when he called on Canada and European states to offer refuge to tens
of thousands of Colombian civilians threatened with political assassination because
the Colombian state was unable to protect them. Paul Knox, Colombian Will Ask
Canada to Help Activists; Refuge Sought for Rights Workers, GLOBE & MAIL, May
27, 1998, at A1.
42 See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Board (Canada), Guidelines on Civilian Non-
Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situations (Mar. 7, 1996), available
at www.irb-cisr.gc.ca./en/references/policy/guidelines/civil_e.htm.
43 For a description and discussion of the relatively narrow French and
German interpretations, see Catherine Phuong, Persecution by Non-State Agents:
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as Refugees adopts the more generous approach on the first two issues, but
remains silent on the third.44 The European Council for Refugees and Exiles
(ECRE) unsuccessfully advocated that explicit account be taken of situations
of failed stateswhere "central government institutions have ceasedor virtually
ceased to exist,"45 though it is at least arguable that the final version of the
Directive does not preclude such an approach.
Without painting a more flattering portrait of refugee jurisprudence than
it merits, I would suggest that the interpretation of the refugee definition
has moved toward acknowledging and accommodating a phenomenon that
did not figure in Arendt’s depiction of apatrides, refugees and rightlessness,
namely the collapse of organized political community as such. Although
Arendt clearly devoted considerable attention to imperialism elsewhere, it
was the experience of totalitarianism within the European geographical
space and not the phenomena of (de)-colonization that informed her
approach to statelessness. The following passage reveals her presupposition
of a globally organized, uninterrupted, system of sovereign, autonomous,
functional states:
The trouble is that this calamity [of rightlessness] arose not from
any lack of civilization, backwardness, or mere tyranny, but, on the
contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no longer any
Comparative Judicial Interpretations of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 4 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 521 (2002).
44 Council Directive 2004/83, Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status
of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or Persons Who
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection
is Granted, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_304/l_30420040930en00120023.pdf.
Article 6 of the Asylum Qualification Directives states that:
Actors of persecution or serious harm include:
(a) the State
(b) parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the
territory of the State
(c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors mentioned in (a)
and (b), including international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide
protection against persecution or serious harm . . . .
The European Commission’s original draft of the Directive also provided that "it
is immaterial if the applicant comes from a country in which many or all persons
face the risk of generalized oppression," but this proviso was dropped from the final
version. See ECRE, ECRE Information Note on the Council Directive 2004/83/EC,
at 9 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.ecre.org/statements/qualpro/pdf.
45 Id. at 7.
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"uncivilized" spot on earth, because whether we like it or not we have
really started to live in One World. Only with a completely organized
humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical
with expulsion from humanity altogether.46
Where refugee law validates an asylum claim based on a state’s inability
to protect a person from persecution at the hands of non-state actors, it
recognizes the failure of the state to fulfill its duty of protection toward
a particular individual. To the extent that nationals of failed states qualify
for asylum, refugee law acknowledges that a state no longer capable of
providing protection per se has ceased to function as a state. At the limit, its
nationals are indeed de facto stateless: they are citizens without a state.
But here again, even this form of statelessness may not entitle one
to protection. In Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,47 the
refugee status of a Somali in the United States was terminated because of a
criminal conviction involving moral turpitude. It was accepted by the U.S.
Supreme Court that the government could not obtain advance consent of the
Somali government to Jama’s return because Somalia lacked a government
capable of furnishing consent. Both the majority judgment of Justice Scalia
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Souter consist of exquisitely intricate
maneuvers of statutory interpretation devoted to the issue of whether the
legislative provision setting out the procedure for selecting a destination for
removal of an alien required the consent of the receiving country. Themajority
concluded that the statute did not preclude deportation of Jama to Somalia,
and that the absence of a functioning government did not render removal
impracticable. According to Justice Scalia, "Removing an alien to Somalia
apparently involves no more than putting the alien on one of the regularly
scheduled flights fromDubai orNairobi, and has been accomplished a number
of times since petitioner’s removal proceedings began." The argument that
Somalia did not qualify as a "country" under the statute owing to the "lack of
anyfunctioningcentralgovernment" isdismissed ina footnoteon thebasis that
it was not properly raised before the lower appellate court.48 This exercise of
juridical formalism performed at the very apex of the United States’ densely
saturated legal order assumes an almost baroque quality when juxtaposed
against the target of its projection— a territorially-demarcated legal vacuum.
Within four months of the decision in Jama, the appellant was transported
to Nairobi by U.S. officials and then removed to an autonomous region in
46 ARENDT, supra note 5, at 297.
47 543 U.S. 335 (2005).
48 Id. at 352 n.13.
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Somalia (Puntland) by a private security firm hired by the U.S. government
precisely because the United States did not have diplomatic ties with the
non-existent government of Somalia. The Puntland "officials" summarily
punted Jama. The private security firm then escorted Jama back to Nairobi
and returned him to immigration detention in the United States. Eventually,
the U.S. Court of Appeal (Eighth Circuit) upheld a District Court order
releasing Jama from detention pending removal.49
Although refugee law proceeds from the instance of displacement,
as does Arendt’s model of statelessness (which is partly why she can
conflate stateless persons and refugees), statelessness is not necessarily
accompanied by transnational displacement. In a critique that interrogates
"the popular staging of the refugee" as the "ultimate Other," Patricia Tuitt
argues compellingly that at present, internally displaced people (IDPs)
are more symptomatic of contemporary rightlessness than refugees: They
remain trapped within a nominal state that renounces them and virtually
abandoned by a global regime that respects the sovereignty of states too
much to intervene effectively. Unlike refugees, they are not cognizable
as legal subjects bearing rights specific to their condition. Thus, IDPs
are in some sense even more abject than those who manage to traverse
international borders and assert the identity and rights of a refugee. Whatever
assistance they receive consists of humanitarian relief and comes from
inter-governmental nor non-governmental organizations, whose presence is
rendered precarious by hostile local authorities.50As theUnitedNationsHigh
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recently reported,
Often persecuted or under attack by their own governments, [internally
displaced persons] are frequently in a more desperate situation than
refugees. . . . Sometimes, mountains and rivers impede flight across
49 Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Civil No. 01-1172 (Dist. Ct. Minn.
motion for release granted May 20, 2005); U.S. Immigration Spent 200K on
Keyse Jama Deportation (Minn. Pub. Radio radio broadcast June 23, 2006),
available at http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/06/23/jamaflight/.
For a fascinating ethnographic study of Somalis deported from Canada and the
U.S. to Somaliland, see Nathalie Peutz, Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal,
47 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 217 (2006).
50 Patricia Tuitt, The Territorialization of Violence, in CRITICAL BEINGS: LAW, NATION
AND THE GLOBAL SUBJECT 37 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds., 2004). Tuitt
makes the important and, in my view, accurate observation that even for those
scholars, such as Giorgio Agamben, who claim adherence to a conception of the
refugee that "exceeds its legal construction, the legal refugee haunts much work of
this kind." Id. at 39.
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borders, or people may flee to other parts of their own country
to remain in relatively familiar surroundings. Even when they do
manage to cross national frontiers, however, the displaced rarely find
a welcome. Hostility to refugees and asylum seekers has grown since
the end of the Cold War, with many countries seeing it as too costly
or destabilizing to admit them. In several recent emergencies, states
have closed their borders to refugees or adopted restrictive admission
policies. As a result, there is an inverse relationship between the rising
number of internally displaced persons and the declining figure for
refugees.51
The descriptive category of "internally displaced persons" emerged partly
out of a desire to make visible (through naming) those who were
similar to refugees but who had not managed to cross an international
frontier. In a particularly cruel and ironic twist, the House of Lords
recently interpreted the refugee definition in a manner that would permit
denial of refugee status to asylum seekers on the basis that they could
survive in their countries of origin as IDPs.52 British asylum authorities
subsequently determined on re-hearing that Darfurian Sudanese appellants
who fled persecution bymilitia sponsored by theKhartoumgovernment, had
an "internal protection alternative": they could return to live in IDP camps
in and around Khartoum.53 It was as if the very exercise of naming "internal
displacement" as a phenomenon and locating it in a geographical space
(IDP camps) transmuted the internally displaced persons from a subject
position so abject that it has no legal existence, into a fixed status of visibility
and viability. The House of Lords thus validated through its jurisprudence
a fear expressed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
that "countries of asylum may renounce their protection obligations toward
refugees and asylum seekers, on the basis that theUN response in the country
of origin provides them with an ‘internal flight alternative.’"54
A correlation between internal displacement and failed states is suggested
by the fact that in addition to producing the world’s largest number of IDPs
51 UNHCR, STATE OF THEWORLD’S REFUGEES 153 (2006) (emphasis added).
52 Januzi v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2 A.C. 426
(appeal taken from Eng.).
53 HGMO (Relocation to Khartoum), Sudan CG [2006] UKAIT 00062 (Asylum &
Immigr. Trib.).
54 Erika Feller, UNHCR’s Role in IDP Protection: Opportunities and Challenges,
FORCED MIGRATION REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 12 (2006).
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(six million),55 Sudan also topped the 2006 Carnegie Fund for Peace/Foreign
Policy Magazine Failed State Index.56 If the apatride embodies the person
without citizenship, then the IDP embodies the citizen without a state. Both
lack a state capable of fulfilling a duty of protection, not even the surrogate
protection owed a refugee under the U.N. Refugee Convention.
Exploring the interplay between the categories of refugee and "internally
displaced person," and the duty of state protection supports a conception
of statelessness that includes nominal citizenship in a failed state. One
benefit of broadening the conception of statelessness in this way is that
it addresses the denial of state protection in forms associated with both
legal citizenship (access to territory, diplomatic protection), and social
citizenship (fundamental rights, entitlements, equality, human security, etc.).
The obverse is that the corresponding conception of citizenship against which
statelessness is positioned encompasses the functional elements of legal and
social citizenship.
This foray into dimensions of refugee law has been in the service of
reclaiming and reconceiving statelessness as a category that retains resonance
as the Other of the citizen. While I commend a concept of statelessness
that encompasses loss of state as well as loss of status, I caution against
casually labeling as "stateless" the array of subject positions occupied by
nationals or migrants who are marginalized, oppressed, or otherwise denied
full enjoyment of membership rights in a given political community. Thus, I
55 UNHCR, supra note 48, at 154.
56 The Fund for Peace, Failed State Index 2006, http://www.fundforpeace.
org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). The British Home
Office also announced its determination to return failed asylum seekers to Iraq,
even though the Foreign Office advises against travel to Iraq owing to dangerous
conditions, and the Ministry of Defence must charter a special flight to effect
the removal. Britain has rejected more than 90% of Iraqi asylum seekers since
2000, and Home Secretary, John Reid, warned that "To ensure the viability of this
operation and in line with enforcement operational instructions, the Home Office
may decide not to defer removal in the face of a last-minute threat or application to
seek judicial review." Home Office Adamant on Iraq Removals, GUARDIAN WKLY.,
Sept. 8-14, 2006, at 13. Iraq ranked fourth on the 2006 Failed State Index. Each
of the five countries with the highest number of IDPs also ranked among those
designated as failed states. According to Internal Displacement, Global Overview
of Trends and Developments in 2005, at 6 (Mar. 2006), http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/895B48136F55F562C12571
380046BDB1/$file/Global%20Overview05%20low.pdf, the top IDP populations
were located in Sudan (5.4 million IDPs), Colombia (up to 3.7 million), Uganda (2
million), DRC (1.7 million) and Iraq (1.3 million). These countries ranked 1, 27,
21, 2 and 4 in the Failed State Index.
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concur with much of Linda Kerber’s fine historicized account of citizenship
and statelessness in the U.S. context, and I arrive at the same conclusion
that "the stateless are the citizen’s Other."57 My project is not, however, to
build a better binary for purposes of allocating everyone to one or the other
side of a dimensionless border dividing citizenship and statelessness. Hence, I
depart fromKerber’s inclination to gather refugees, slaves, trafficked persons,
detainees at Guanta`namo Bay and non-status migrants under the rubric of
statelessness. I sympathize with the ethical impulse animating this rhetorical
move, butworry that it poses two risks: first, it homogenizes an arrayof subject
positions (illuminating by virtue of their diversity), through the brute force of
dichotomizing them into citizen or stateless. Secondly, an overly expansive
invocationof statelessness for descriptive purposes almost inevitably dulls the
critical and analytical edge that amore precise reconfiguration of statelessness
can offer in relation to thinking about citizenship.
II. BETWEEN THE CITIZEN AND THE STATELESS:
MEASURING THE HEFT OF CITIZENSHIP
It remains to demonstrate that redeeming statelessness as the antipodal
reference point for citizenship has any analytic utility. Rather than conceive
of citizenship and statelessness as an "either/or" proposition, I posit them
as idealized representations of presence and absence, between which lay a
range of subject positions that most people actually occupy. I further propose
that the substance of the citizenship experienced by individuals is produced
by the synthesis of elements comprising legal and social citizenship in all
countries where the individual has formed significant attachments. This
means that while citizenship retains its connection to a state, it represents a
composite of the elements of membership within and between all states to
which the individual is connected. I measure this compound citizenship in
terms of the "heft" of citizenship.
The preceding analysis implicitly critiqued the legal category of refugee
as too limited and limiting to perform the role of the citizen’s Other. I also
contend that other popular "Others" of the citizen, such as the alien, the
foreigner, the second-class citizen and the stranger, are nested within the
broader idea of statelessness. Consider the alien. The condition of alienage
remains defined by reference to the state of territorial presence. That is
to say, one is an alien with respect to, and from the perspective of, a
57 Kerber, supra note 3.
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particular political community. One may pass through legal gradations of
alienage en route to citizenship (and one may remain socially, culturally
or economically alienated despite acquiring legal citizenship), but these
statuses are constituted and transpire within the self-contained unit of the
territorial nation-state. My concern with the citizen vs. alien binary is not
that it is incorrect, but only that it is incomplete. It tends to totalize the
relationship of the individual to a single and particularized territorial state,
thereby misapprehending a fragment for the whole.
The vast literature on transnational citizenship demonstrates the multiple
linkages across an array of dimensions (legal, social, kinship, economic,
political) that exist among migrants and diasporic communities. What it also
does is remind us of how the significance of the status (legal and otherwise)
of an individual to a given state is conditioned by her relationships to other
individuals, communities and to states.
The importance of situating an individual within a matrix of all states to
which she is connected lies in bringing to the surface the taken-for-granted
but crucial point that one may be an alien in relation to most states, but
almost everyone is simultaneously a citizen of at least one state. The fact
of being a citizen somewhere else matters for the alien, as does the content
of that citizenship. Alienage certainly does not feel the same to all aliens,
and for reasons that are not wholly determined by the formal conditions
of residence imposed by the receiving state. The experience of alienage is
profoundly shaped by the alternatives open to the alien.
The limiting case that frames the experience and impact of alienage is not
the one who does not wish to return to her country of citizenship, however,
but the one who cannot because she has no country of citizenship to which
she can return, namely the stateless person (within the double signification
described above). The impact of alienage would be unmitigated by her
citizenship elsewhere. No matter how bad life becomes for the stateless
person, there is no better (or less bad) place to go. I acknowledge that
statelessness among migrants is in decline compared to other precarious
non-citizen positions, but my point here is not empirical. My argument
about statelessness is not primarily directed at exploring statelessness for
its own sake. Rather, I offer an account of how statelessness operates as
the conceptual reference point for citizenship’s Other precisely in order to
set parameters capable of bringing the status, relationships, and practices of
these intermediate subjects of citizenship within a wider-angle lens than the
citizen-alien nexus can capture.58
I remarked earlier that a plausible heuristic for locating subjects in this
58 A reasonable objection to this approach is that the focus on non-citizens excludes
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matrix is to imagine citizenship as a substance with heft. What are the
ingredients that combine to constitute the heft? I propose that elements
associated with legal citizenship as well as social citizenship contribute to
the mix. I resist attributing a priori weight to individual factors solely on
the basis of whether they are associated with legal or social citizenship. The
unconditional right to enter and reside, the franchise, diplomatic protection
factor, civil, social, economic and cultural rights, entitlements, duties,
identity claims and practices each warrant consideration, but should not
and often cannot be weighted independently of one another. The practical
availability of diplomatic protection to a citizen abroad may be colored
by tacit evaluations of the citizen’s normative claim to membership in the
polity, or by the state’s calculus regarding the force of the duties it owes to
citizens as against maintenance of good relations with other states.
The value of the right to enter and remain in one’s country of citizenship
is conditioned by the quality of social citizenship available generally and in
particular to an individual. Returning to one’s country of citizenship may
represent the restoration of state protection, or consignment to an abyss. That
citizens of one state might choose to forego the security of legal citizenship
to live under conditions of alienage that render them precarious and unequal
in another state speaks to the fact that even marginal membership in the
economy of a stable and wealthy state can seem preferable to whatever
citizenship in a destitute, conflict-ridden state offers. Equating the heft of
citizenship with the economic dimensions or consequences of citizenship
would be unduly reductive, but in a world of radical disparities of wealth
(and of the preconditions to human functioning, in Amartya Sen’s account),59
the role of economic opportunity and the impact of legal citizenship’s mobility
constraints is self-evident. Moreover, gross inequalities between citizens of a
given polity on the basis of class, race, sex, ability, ethnicity and other variables
mean that the heft of citizenship varies internally as well as externally. In
short, the heft of citizenship is produced through the specific and contingent
interaction of the variables constituting both legal and social citizenship for a
given individual.
In sum, measuring the heft of citizenship provides a means of relativizing
citizenships within and between states, recognizing that citizenship for most
people is not a container that is either full or empty. My proposal also
offers a bridge traversing the discursive divide between legal citizenship
internally displaced citizens from the field of inquiry, thereby lending undue primacy
to territorial location as a discontinuous form of displacement.
59 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000).
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol8/iss2/art1
2007] Who Is the Citizen’s Other? 357
and at least some of the alternative articulations of citizenship currently in
circulation.60
The remainder of this Article illustrates how thinking about citizenship
in terms of heft can assist in clarifying the positioning of various migrant
subjects.
A. Patterns of Migration
In general, the heft of citizenship negatively correlates to the incentives
to migrate, and positively correlates to the legal capacity to migrate.
Consider refugees: their citizenship delivers them little protection from
violations of fundamental rights, and so they flee. Even states that interpret
the refugee definition more generously than others expend considerable
resources in preventing asylum seekers from reaching the borders of the
state. Despite the ostensible legal obligations binding the 146 States Party
to the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, there is virtually
no lawful means for an asylum seeker to reach Europe, North America
or Australia/New Zealand. Visas are required from refugee producing
countries, and almost never knowingly issued to anyone admitting or
suspected of an intention to seek asylum. Safe third country agreements
such as the EU Dublin Regulation61 or the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country
Agreement62 restrict asylum seekers to lodging their refugee claims in the first
country of arrival and preclude consideration by another state that is party
to the agreement. Carrier sanctions penalize ships or airlines that transport
improperly documented people (including asylum seekers who resort to
false documents). Governments post officials at airports abroad to screen
passengers’ documents prior to boarding, or delegate the function to private
airline officials. States notionally excise morsels of territory— airport transit
lounges or, in Australia, the coastline perimeter— for the express and limited
60 This reframing of citizenship also offers the possibility of dissolving the paradox
of the "citizenship of aliens" (discussed supra note 8), once one accepts that the
citizenship in question aggregates not only the attributes of membership in the state
of alienage, but also those in the state(s) of legal citizenship.
61 Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 Establishing the Criteria and
Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining
an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the Member States by a
Third-Country National, 2003 OJ (L 50) 1 (EC), available at http://
www.uvi.fi/download.asp?id=Dublin+II+asetus+eng;979;%7B8C0EC6FC-E189-
4ED9-88C1-FC4132E6E978%7D.
62 Safe Third Country Agreement, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe-third.html.
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purpose of repelling asylum seekers. And these are only the non-entre´e
mechanisms; one could compile an equally long list of the deterrent and
punitive strategies for immiserating asylum seekers who manage to reach
many of these states.
From the perspective of receiving states, these strategies are designed to
deflect and criminalize self-selected, spontaneous migration by those whose
citizenship falls below a certain substantive threshold in the countries of
origin. Although western governments typically allege that the migrants
they intend to deter are seeking economic opportunities and not fleeing
persecution, neither the techniques deployed to fortify borders, nor those
used to surmount them (smuggling and trafficking) differentiate between
migrants on the basis of motive.
At the other end of the spectrum, the heft of citizenship for the educated
and elite in any given society frequently insulates them from the pressures
that impel others to migrate. But if and when they determine that citizenship
elsewhere offers amore attractive or secure package of benefits, they can take
advantage of the opportunity by accessing the various skilled-worker and
entrepreneur immigration programs run by settler societies (Canada, U.S.,
Australia, New Zealand) and increasingly emulated by Britain, Germany
and other EU states.63 AihwaOng’s account of "flexible citizenship" superbly
documents this phenomenon.64 Citizenship can function as a commodity for
those with the resources to play the market.
63 Canada and Australia operate points systems whereby entrants acquire permanent
resident status more or less automatically. While the United States delegates greater
control to private employers by tying permanent residence ("green cards") to a
specific offer of employment, in practice, most skilled workers enter the U.S. on
temporary employment visas and convert their status to permanent residence through
employer-sponsored petitions. Britain and France are at various stages of initiating
their own points systems, while Germany has introduced a system that operates
similar to the U.S. insofar as skilled workers enter on temporary visas and become
eligible for permanent residence after five years.
64 AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY
(1999).A notorious Canadian example is ConradBlack, the disgracedmedia baronwho
renounced his Canadian citizenship in favor of British citizenship so he could become
a peer in the House of Lords, and explained his decision by declaring that Canadian
citizenship "is not now for me competitive with that of the United Kingdom and the
EuropeanUnion." LindaMcQuaig, I amNOTCanadian, GLOBE&MAIL,May26, 2001,
at F4. With the possibility of criminal conviction in the United States presently looming
before Mr. Black, he is attempting to re-acquire Canadian citizenship. Canada and the
United States have a prisoner transfer agreement that enables Canadians convicted in
U.S. courts to serve their sentences in Canadian prisons. The United Kingdom does not
have a prisoner transfer agreement with the United States.
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Somewhere between the irregular migrant and the global
entrepreneur/high-skill worker resides the vast majority of today’s lawful
immigrants to countries of the North, namely those who enter on the basis
of kinship with existing residents and citizens. Casting an entitlement to
transnational family formation and reunification in terms of citizenship’s heft
surfaces the ability to sponsor familymembers as a particularly valuable asset
of citizenship. Again, the value of sponsoring relatives can only be assessed
against the other elements constituting membership in the destination state.65
Taking into account the variable heft of citizenships also helps to explain
the paradox of the EU’s open borders. For all the ease of mobility and
relocation, Western Europeans hardly relocate at all. Barriers of language
and skill recognition may impede some. But for others, the simple question
must be "why move?" — what can life in Belgium offer that life in Denmark
cannot? Like solutions separated by a semi-permeable membrane, when
substantive citizenship is at equilibrium on either side of the membrane, one
would expect little diffusion. Two decades ago, the anticipated emigration
from new member states, Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) did not
materialize despite somewhat lower standards of living in the latter states.
The pattern thus far seems to be that borders will be most open to those whose
hefty citizenship makes them least likely to move, except as consumers or
as couriers of global trade and investment. European Union citizenship does
indeed mark a remarkable and profound transformation of that quintessential
modern expression of state sovereignty, namely border control. However,
it cannot escape notice that states are most comfortable compromising
the mobility-constraining aspect of legal citizenship under conditions of a
rough parity in the heft of citizenship between nation-states.66 Apart from
a peripatetic class of global elites and intrepid twenty- and thirty-somethings
seeking education and/or adventure, the truism remains true in the EU: people
tend not to leave unless they are pushed.
The recent accession of ten new states to the EU (EU10) will test this
hypothesis. All are poorer in economic and political terms than the other EU
states (EU15). Contrary to past practice, however, all EU15 states except
Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom initially imposed restraints on
labor market access for citizens of the newly admitted members. For these
twelve states, the regulatory practice of border control will temporarily
65 Some states (Canada, Germany) do not distinguish between citizens and permanent
residents in terms of their ability to sponsor family members, while others (U.S.)
give preference to citizens.
66 The same holds true for visa exemption.
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remain within the authority of individual member states, precisely because
of the anticipated migration consequences of EU enlargement.67 Some in
Ireland, Sweden and Britain are gambling that EUmigration from east towest
will not increase to unmanageable levels, and quietly welcome the migration
as a corrective to the demographic and labor market shortfall that domestic
politics preclude addressing directly via a considered immigration policy. A
recent European Commission interim report on labor migration trends from
EU10 to EU15 states suggests that the gamble is paying off economically.68
Politically, the story is different: When Bulgaria and Romania acceded to
the European Union in January 2007, Britain reversed its earlier position and
restricted access to its labor market. A newspaper report quoted an unnamed
British Cabinet minister who admitted that the decision was driven by public
anxiety over migration, security and multiculturalism: "[W]e have a strong
record on accepting migrants from Europe, but sometimes politics has to
override the economics."69
From the perspective of the EU10 states (including Bulgaria and
Romania), accession augments the heft of national citizenship (compared
to neighboring non-accession states) in direct proportion to the ability
of EU10 nationals to move and work freely in EU15 states. Of course,
the long-term objective of EU membership is to make citizenship within
states heftier, thereby minimizing the incentives to migrate to the point
67 Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain recently announced their intention to remove
remaining barriers to free movement for citizens of EU10 states; Belgium, France,
Italy and Luxembourg intend to ease certain restrictions. Germany, Denmark and
Austria intend to retain their visa requirements for workers from EU10. In practice,
Germany has issued 500,000 work permits to Eastern European workers since
2004. EU Labour Chief Calls for End to Labour Barriers, EXPATICA, May 2,
2006, http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=26&story_id
=29696.
68 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions: Report on the Functioning of the Transitional
Arrangements Set Out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April
2006), COM (2006) 48 final (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0048en01.doc; see also Eur. Comm’n
Directorate-Gen. for Econ. & Fin. Affairs & Eur. Comm’n Bureau of European
Policy Advisers, Enlargement, Two Years After: An Economic Evaluation 79-85
(May 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/
2006/ocp24en.pdf.
69 Patrick Wintour, Permit Scheme to Cut Flow of East Europeans,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/immigration/
story/0„1861634,00.html.
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that intra-EU migration will approach or reach equilibrium again. In the
short-run, however, large-scale migration of relatively inexpensive labor
from east to west actually suits the interests of the EU15 states as much as
the sending states of EU10.
B. Temporary Migration
Consider the French nanny and the Filipino nanny working in Canada.
Both possess the same temporary employment visa, thereby occupying the
same legal status. Yet the condition of alienage affects them in dramatically
different ways: the French au pair is likely a student who has come to
Canada temporarily, with a view to traveling, experiencing life in another
country, perhaps improving her English. Her presence in Canada is a
matter of indifference to France. The Filipino nanny is almost certainly
sending remittances home to family members (possibly including her own
children), and likely intends to acquire Canadian permanent residence
and then citizenship at the earliest opportunity. The government of the
Philippines is intensely invested in facilitating this outmigration of its
nationals, whose remittances are crucial to the Philippine economy, and
effectively comprise the main source of its hard currency. The Filipino
nanny’s identity qua foreigner is racialized and gendered differently and
disadvantageously compared to the French nanny’s identity. If the French
nanny finds herself dissatisfied with her work situation, return to France is
viable and relatively costless. The same is not true for the Filipino nanny,
for whom the fear of deportation operates as a powerful disciplining force.
The gender dynamics that shape citizenship in the country of origin may
also inflect the material experience of alienage: A recent United Nations
Population Fund report indicates that female migrant workers remit a higher
percentage of their lower incomes than do male migrant workers, and they
tend to direct more money toward health care and education because "women
tend to invest more in their children than men."70
The comparison between the French and the Filipino nanny illustrates how
the relative heft of citizenship between sending and receiving state structures
the experience of temporary labor migrants. It also tells us something about
the heft of affluent Canadian women’s citizenship. The availability of
migrant care-givers for those with the means to hire them means that child
care retains its character as both private and as "women’s work," and
70 UNFPA, State of World Population 2006: A Passage to Hope 29 (2006),
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/pdf/en_sowp06.pdf.
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women’s participation in the professional workplace becomes dependent
upon the labor of other women with more precarious citizenships.71
It seems empirically indisputable that mass temporary worker regimes are
sustained by the variance between substantive citizenship in sending and
receiving states. It is important to recognize that the normative argument
for access to secure legal status derives much (though not all) of its force
from this disparity. It is unlikely that many North Americans and Europeans
working in the Gulf States feel unjustly treated because they can never obtain
citizenship in Saudi Arabia or Qatar, whatever the size of their contribution
to the economy or duration of residence in those states.
The availability of diplomatic protection to citizens abroad evinces the
heft of citizenship between states and at the level of the state-citizen nexus.
Diplomatic protection is commonly assumed to be a classic entitlement of
legal citizenship. A diffident response to appeals for that protection may
expose the flimsiness of certain individual’s citizenship, or the weakness
of some citizenships compared to others. An example of the former might
be the alleged failure of the Canadian government to furnish consular
assistance to Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen detained at Guanta`namo Bay
since age fifteen.72 An example of the latter might be the reluctance of major
labor exporting states to come to the aid of their migrant workers when the
latter encounter abuse or exploitation in host states. In principle, governments
of sending states have a duty to defend their nationals abroad from rights
violations in receiving states.73 If states’ formal sovereign equality were
matched substantively, the reciprocal interests of each state in the welfare of
their nationals abroadmight actually ensure a decently equivalent standard of
protection. But of course, this situation does not obtain. It is thus unsurprising
that the U.N. Convention on Migrant Workers and their Families74 attempts
to compensate for the weakness of sending states by recasting protection of
71 I am not claiming that the existing sexual division of labor or the organization
of the workplace are normatively justified. For an analysis of migrant domestic
workers, see Audrey Macklin, Foreign Domestic Worker: Surrogate Housewife or
Mail Order Servant?, 37 MCGILL L.J. 681 (2006).
72 Omar Khadr has challenged the denial of consular assistance as a breach of his
constitutional rights and a breach of the Canadian government’s statutory duties.
The litigation is ongoing. See Khadr v. Canada, [2004] 266 F.T.R. 20 (Fed. Ct.).
73 Under international law, states have the right to assert diplomatic protection of their
nationals against foreign states; whether citizens have a right to demand diplomatic
protection from their state of nationality is less clear.
74 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, G.A. Res. 45/158, Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/45/49.
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migrant workers in terms of human rights owed directly to workers by host
states. It is equally unremarkable that the only signatories to the Migrant
Workers Convention thus far have been sending states.75
C. Dual Citizenship
The relative heft of citizenship obviously influences instrumental decisions
by migrants about acquisition of a second or subsequent citizenship. The
benefits of transnational citizenship to sending states can also translate into
the revision of entrenched attitudes toward dual and multiple citizenship.
In particular, less-developed states that formerly prohibited dual citizenship
are now beginning to value their expatriates in accordance with the passport
they surrendered their original citizenship to acquire. These states now have
an incentive to permit multiple citizenships in anticipation that this will
encourage diasporic communities to sustain and expand certain affiliations
to the "home" country. India offers a particularly striking case study.76
India imposes limits on foreign investment by non-citizens. Up until
recently, it also prohibited dual or multiple nationality. In early 2003, India
amended its citizenship law to permit "persons of Indian origin" (PIO) who
hold citizenship in other countries to retain or reclaim a qualified form of
Indian citizenship, called Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). Bearers of
an OCI passport acquire the permanent right to enter India without a visa
and parity with non-resident Indians in economic, educational and financial
domains. They do not acquire the franchise or the right to stand for public
office.77 The original proposal limited access to citizens of sixteen countries:
Canada, the United States, eleven EU members, Israel, Australia and New
Zealand.78 Awebsite sponsored by the IndianMinistry of ExternalAffairs and
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industrymade no secret
75 In the context of the "war on terror," the interventions of Britain, Australia and France
on behalf of their detained nationals in Guanta`namo Bay have been conspicuously
more successful than similar attempts by the government of Pakistan. It must be
said here that Canada’s efforts in this regard appear less assiduous than those of
other similarly situated states.
76 For other illuminating discussions of this phenomenon, see Catherine Dauvergne,
Citizenship with a Vengeance, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 489 (2007); Ratna
Kapur, The Citizen and the Migrant: Postcolonial Anxieties, Law and the Politics
of Exclusion/Inclusion, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 537 (2007).
77 Embassy of India, Persons of Indian Origin — Card Scheme,
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/PIO/Introduction_PIO.html (last visited Sept.
4, 2006).
78 IndiaDay.org, Dual Citizenship Now a Reality, http://indiaday.org/dual-citizen.htm
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of the motive behind the preferential treatment of diasporic Indians living in
states where the heft of citizenship along non-cultural dimensions arguably
exceeds Indian citizenship. Even the reference to the psychological dimension
of citizenship — the feeling of "belonging" — is linked to enhancing the
material benefits to India of dual citizenship:
Persons of Indian origin settled in economically more advanced
countries of the world have skills and expertise in vital sectors.
There is no doubt that investments are induced principally by the logic
of business considerations and the investment climate. The facility of
Dual Citizenship would foster better co-operation in these sectors by
way of investments and transfer of skills and resources.
The principal rationale of the demand of the Diaspora for dual
citizenship, however, is sentimental and psychological. Desire of PIOs
to forge emotional and cultural bonds with their country of origin is
quite evident in the amount of philanthropic activities done by them
in India. Dual Citizenship shall strengthen this bond and facilitate
Diaspora’s contribution in India’s social Development.79
Indeed, the investments, philanthropic activities and skills transfer
anticipated through the conferral of Overseas Citizenship can be viewed
as an appeal to national belonging in the service of supplementing the
package of citizenship entitlements delivered through the existing system of
governance in India. This selective reclamation of Persons of Indian Origin
illustrates what Aihwa Ong describes as the emergence of a neo-liberal
"ethics of citizen-formation [that] are not confined to the West but have
migrated to emerging sites of hypergrowth."80 The idealized Indian citizen
was thus revealed as homo economicus, the enterprising market citizen.81
Eventually, in 2005, the government of India relented and extended eligibility
for Overseas Indian Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin from any state
that permits dual citizenship.82
(last visited May 16, 2004). The list of qualifying European states excludes those
that prohibit dual citizenship.
79 Id.
80 Aihwa Ong, Experiments with Freedom: Milieus of the Human, 18 AM. LITERARY
HIST. 226, 237 (2006).
81 Id.
82 High Commission of India, London, Promulgation of Citizenship (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2005, http://www.hcilondon.net/Overseas-Indian-Citizenship/index.html
(last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
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CONCLUSION
The technologies of identity documentation provide a handy distillation
of citizenship’s heft within and across borders in an era of uneven global
mobility: Arendt wrote incisively about how "loss of citizenship deprived
people not only of protection, but also of all clearly established, officially
recognized identity, a fact for which their eternal feverish efforts to obtain
at least birth certificates from the country that denationalized them was
a very exact symbol."83 The contemporary traffickers and unscrupulous
employerswho seize the passports of traffickedpersons or non-statusmigrants
aim to exacerbate the vulnerability of their victims by withholding the legal
identity document that would facilitate access consular protection (including
repatriation) by their state of nationality. This is one means of creating "de
facto" statelessness. Yet it is at least equally common for asylum-seekers and
non-status migrants to destroy their passports precisely in order to prevent
or at least delay repatriation to their state of citizenship. Even trafficked
persons may dread return to their home country. Moreover, the person most
likely to lack access to an "officially recognized identity" today is not the
denationalized citizen, but rather the citizen of a failed state that lacks the
governmental infrastructure required to generate official identity documents.
For example, the inability of Afghans and Somalis to prove their identity to
the satisfaction of Canadian immigration officials for purposes of obtaining
permanent resident status can delay the permanent residence of recognized
refugees for several years, leaving them in a legal limbo without the ability to
sponsor family members or acquire legal citizenship.
Finally, post-9/11 border practices reveal the signaling function of
passports as a quick calibration of citizenship’s combined legal and
substantive heft: After decades of requiring only birth certificates or driver’s
licenses as identification at the border, the United States government has
initiated a policy of accepting only passports from Canadian citizens. This
signifies a certain demotion of Canadian citizens from their privileged status
as exempt from the formality of passport requirements.
Of course, Canadian citizenship retains its elevated position in the
hierarchy insofar as a Canadian passport is infinitely more valuable at
the U.S. border than, say, a Pakistani passport. Presentation of the latter
will not enable entry without an accompanying visa. However, Canadian
passports also contain data unavailable on drivers’ licenses, such as place
of birth. One cannot but speculate that a Canadian passport listing "place
83 ARENDT, supra note 5, at 287.
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of birth" as Winnipeg (or even Vienna) routinely attracts less attention than
one indicating a Karachi birthplace. Indeed, the fact that Canadian passports
still identify place of birth reveals something about lingering differences in
the heft of citizenship for the birthright versus the naturalized citizen.84 In
addition, a recent pilot study of border stops by British immigration officials
reveals that non-white Canadian citizens seeking entry to the UK were nine
times more likely to be stopped for questioning than white Canadians. In
order to control for the possibility that non-white Canadians are scrutinized
more closely because they are poor (and thus allegedly more likely to work
illegally in the UK), the researchers adjusted the figures to control for socio-
economic status. The adjusted stopping rates increased the gap: A non-white
Canadian was 13.5 times more likely to be stopped than a white Canadian of
equal socio-economic status.85 Race and class (and race as proxy for class)
apparently diminish the heft of what is otherwise one of the most substantial
citizenships in the world.
The foregoing journey has arrived at citizenship by way of statelessness
as its alterity. In a similarly oblique fashion, I have not answered the why
question about citizenship. Instead, I proposed how we might integrate
our thinking about citizenship. My aspiration is that calibrating the heft
of citizenship’s diverse elements will advance the dialogue across the
disciplinary frontiers of citizenship scholarship.
84 In fairness, the passport of a birthright citizen born abroad to a Canadian citizen
would also list a non-Canadian birthplace.
85 Kandy Woodfield et al., Exploring the Decision-Making of Immigration Officers: A
Research Study Examining Non-EEA Passenger Stops and Refusals at UK Ports 43
(Jan. 2007), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/rdsolr0107.pdf. The authors
of the report caution that the size of the sample group was too small to permit
definitive conclusions about racism as a causal factor. Interestingly, there was no
statistically significant difference in the stop rate of white and non-white Americans.
Id.
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